The goal of Wikileaks, and why the mainstream media scapegoat Assange.

[Pi-Qui Baltink]

; “To radically shift regime behavior we must think clearly and boldly for if we have learned anything, it is that

regimes do not want to be changed. We must think beyond those who have gone before us, and discover technological changes that

embolden us with ways to act in which our forebears could not. Firstly we must understand what aspect of government or

neocorporatist behavior we wish to change or remove. Secondly we must develop a way of thinking about this behavior that is strong

enough carry us through the mire of politically distorted language, and into a position of clarity. Finally must use these

insights to inspire within us and others a course of ennobling, and effective action.”

Julian Assange, “State and Terrorist Conspiracies”

The piece of writing (via) which that quote introduces is intellectually substantial, but not all that difficult to read, so you

might as well take a look at it yourself. Most of the news media seems to be losing their minds over Wikileaks without actually

reading these essays, even though he describes the function and aims of an organization like Wikileaks in pretty straightforward

terms. But, to summarize, he begins by describing a state like the US as essentially an authoritarian conspiracy, and then reasons

that the practical strategy for combating that conspiracy is to degrade its ability to conspire, to hinder its ability to “think”

as a conspiratorial mind. The metaphor of a computing network is mostly implicit, but utterly crucial: he seeks to oppose the

power of the state by treating it like a computer and tossing sand in its diodes.

He begins by positing that conspiracy and authoritarianism go hand in hand, arguing that since authoritarianism produces

resistance to itself — to the extent that its authoritarianism becomes generally known — it can only continue to exist and

function by preventing its intentions (the authorship of its authority?) from being generally known. It inevitably becomes, he

argues, a conspiracy:

Authoritarian regimes give rise to forces which oppose them by pushing against the individual and collective will to freedom,

truth and self realization. Plans which assist authoritarian rule, once discovered, induce resistance. Hence these plans are

concealed by successful authoritarian powers. This is enough to define their behavior as conspiratorial.

The problem this creates for the government conspiracy then becomes the organizational problem it must solve: if the conspiracy

must operate in secrecy, how is it to communicate, plan, make decisions, discipline itself, and transform itself to meet new

challenges? The answer is: by controlling information flows. After all, if the organization has goals that can be articulated,

articulating them openly exposes them to resistance. But at the same time, failing to articulate those goals to itself deprives

the organization of its ability to process and advance them. Somewhere in the middle, for the authoritarian conspiracy, is the

right balance of authority and conspiracy.

His model for imagining the conspiracy, then, is not at all the cliché that people mean when they sneer at someone for being a

“conspiracy theorist.” After all, most the “conspiracies” we’re familiar with are pure fantasies, and because the “Elders of Zion”

or James Bond’s SPECTRE have never existed, their nonexistence becomes a cudgel for beating on people that would ever use the term

or the concept. For Assange, by contrast, a conspiracy is something fairly banal, simply any network of associates who act in

concert by hiding their concerted association from outsiders, an authority that proceeds by preventing its activities from being

visible enough to provoke counter-reaction. It might be something as dramatic as a loose coalition of conspirators working to

start a war with Iraq/n, or it might simply be the banal, everyday deceptions and conspiracies of normal diplomatic procedure.

He illustrates this theoretical model by the analogy of a board with nails hammered into it and then tied together with twine:

First take some nails (“conspirators”) and hammer them into a board at random. Then take twine (“communication”) and loop it

from nail to nail without breaking. Call the twine connecting two nails a link. Unbroken twine means it is possible to travel from

any nail to any other nail via twine and intermediary nails…Information flows from conspirator to conspirator. Not every

conspirator trusts or knows every other conspirator even though all are connected. Some are on the fringe of the conspiracy,

others are central and communicate with many conspirators and others still may know only two conspirators but be a bridge between

important sections or groupings of the conspiracy…

Conspirators are often discerning, for some trust and depend each other, while others say little. Important information flows

frequently through some links, trivial information through others. So we expand our simple connected graph model to include not

only links, but their “importance.”

Return to our board-and-nails analogy. Imagine a thick heavy cord between some nails and fine light thread between others.

Call the importance, thickness or heaviness of a link its weight. Between conspirators that never communicate the weight is zero.

The “importance” of communication passing through a link is difficult to evaluate apriori, since its true value depends on the

outcome of the conspiracy. We simply say that the “importance” of communication contributes to the weight of a link in the most

obvious way; the weight of a link is proportional to the amount of important communication flowing across it. Questions about

conspiracies in general won’t require us to know the weight of any link, since that changes from conspiracy to conspiracy.

Such a network will not be organized by a flow chart, nor would it ever produce a single coherent map of itself (without thereby

hastening its own collapse). :It is probably fairly acephalous, as a matter of course; if it had a single head (or a singular

organizing mind which could survey and map the entirety), then every conspirator would be one step from the boss and a short two

steps away from every other member of the conspiracy. A certain amount of centralization is necessary, in other words (otherwise

there is no conspiracy), but too much centralization makes the system vulnerable.

To use The Wire as a ready-to-hand example, imagine if Avon Barksdale was communicating directly with Bodie. All you would ever

have to do is turn one person — any person — and you would be one step away from the boss, whose direct connection to everyone

else in the conspiracy would allow you to sweep them all up at once. Obviously, no effective conspiracy would ever function this

way. Remember Stringer Bell’s “is you taking notes on a criminal fucking conspiracy?” To function effectively, the primary

authority has to be disassociated from all other members of the conspiracy, layers of mediation which have to be as opaque as

possible to everyone concerned (which a paper trail unhelpfully clarifies). But while the complexity of these linkages shield the

directing authority from exposure, they also limit Avon Barksdale’s ability to control what’s going on around him. Businesses run

on their paperwork! And the more walls you build around him, the less he might be able to trust his lieutenants, and the less

they’ll require (or tolerate) him.

This, Assange reasons, is a way to turn a feature into a bug. And his underlying insight is simple and, I think, compelling: while

an organization structured by direct and open lines of communication will be much more vulnerable to outside penetration, the more

opaque it becomes to itself (as a defense against the outside gaze), the less able it will be to “think” as a system, to

communicate with itself. The more conspiratorial it becomes, in a certain sense, the less effective it will be as a conspiracy.

The more closed the network is to outside intrusion, the less able it is to engage with that which is outside itself (true hacker

theorizing).

His thinking is not quite as abstract as all that, of course; as he quite explicitly notes, he is also understanding the

functioning of the US state by analogy with successful terrorist organizations. If you’ve seen The Battle of Algiers, for example,

think of how the French counter-terrorist people work to produce an organizational flow chart of the Algerian resistance movement:

since they had overwhelming military superiority, their inability to crush the FLN resided in their inability to find it, an

inability which the FLN strategically works to impede by decentralizing itself. Cutting off one leg of the octopus, the FLN

realized, wouldn’t degrade the system as a whole if the legs all operated independently. The links between the units were the

vulnerable spots for the system as a whole, so those were most closely and carefully guarded and most hotly pursued by the French.

And while the French won the battle of Algiers, they lost the war, because they adopted the tactics Assange briefly mentions only

to put aside:

How can we reduce the ability of a conspiracy to act?…We can split the conspiracy, reduce or eliminating important

communication between a few high weight links or many low weight links. Traditional attacks on conspiratorial power groupings,

such as assassination, have cut high weight links by killing, kidnapping, blackmailing or otherwise marginalizing or isolating

some of the conspirators they were connected to.

This is the US’s counterterrorism strategy — find the men in charge and get ’em — but it’s not what Assange wants to do: such a

program would isolate a specific version of the conspiracy and attempt to destroy the form of it that already exists, which he

argues will have two important limitations. For one thing, by the time such a conspiracy has a form which can be targeted, its

ability to function will be quite advanced. As he notes:

“A man in chains knows he should have acted sooner for his ability to influence the actions of the state is near its end. To

deal with powerful conspiratorial actions we must think ahead and attack the process that leads to them since the actions

themselves can not be dealt with.”

By the time a cancer has metastasized, in other words, antioxidents are no longer effective, and even violent chemotherapy is

difficult. It’s better, then, to think about how conspiracies come into existence so as to prevent them from forming in the first

place (whereas if you isolate the carcinogen early enough, you don’t need to remove the tumor after the fact). Instead, he wants

to address the aggregative process itself, by impeding the principle of its reproduction: rather than trying to expose and cut

particular links between particular conspirators (which does little to prevent new links from forming and may not disturb the

actual functioning of the system as a whole), he wants to attack the “total conspiratorial power” of the entire system by figuring

out how to reduce its total ability to share and exchange information among itself, in effect, to slow down its processing power.

As he puts it:

Conspiracies are cognitive devices. They are able to outthink the same group of individuals acting alone Conspiracies take

information about the world in which they operate (the conspiratorial environment), pass through the conspirators and then act on

the result. We can see conspiracies as a type of device that has inputs (information about the environment), a computational

network (the conspirators and their links to each other) and outputs (actions intending to change or maintain the environment).

Because he thinks of the conspiracy as a computational network, he notes in an aside that one way to weaken its cognitive ability

would be to degrade the quality of its information:

Since a conspiracy is a type of cognitive device that acts on information acquired from its environment, distorting or

restricting these inputs means acts based on them are likely to be misplaced. Programmers call this effect garbage in, garbage

out. Usually the effect runs the other way; it is conspiracy that is the agent of deception and information restriction. In the

US, the programmer’s aphorism is sometimes called “the Fox News effect”.

I’m not sure this is what he means, but it’s worth reflecting that the conspiracy’s ability to deceive others through propaganda

can also be the conspiracy’s tendency to deceive itself by its own propaganda. So many people genuinely drink the Kool-Aid, after

all. Would our super-spies in Afghanistan ever have been so taken in by the imposter Taliban guy if they didn’t, basically,

believe their own line of propaganda, if they didn’t convince themselves — even provisionally — that we actually are winning the

war against Talibothra? The same is true of WMD; while no one in possession of the facts could rationally conclude that Saddam

Hussein then (or Iran now) are actually, positively in pursuit of WMD’s, this doesn’t mean that the people talking about ticking

time bombs don’t actually believe that they are. It just means they are operating with bad information about the environment.

Sometimes this works in their favor, but sometimes it does not: if Obama thinks Afghanistan is winnable, it may sink his

presidency, for example, while the belief of his advisors that the economy would recover if the government rescued only the banks

almost certainly lost the midterm elections for the Democrats (and was the death-knell for so many of the Blue Dogs who were

driving that particular policy choice). Whether this actually hurts the conspiracy is unclear; those Blue Dogs might have lost

their seats, but most of them will retire from public service to cushy jobs supported by the sectors they supported while they

were in public service. And lots of successful politicians do nothing but fail.

This is however, not where Assange’s reasoning leads him. He decides, instead, that the most effective way to attack this kind of

organization would be to make “leaks” a fundamental part of the conspiracy’s information environment. Which is why the point is

not that particular leaks are specifically effective. Wikileaks does not leak something like the “Collateral Murder” video as a

way of putting an end to that particular military tactic; that would be to target a specific leg of the hydra even as it grows two

more. Instead, the idea is that increasing the porousness of the conspiracy’s information system will impede its functioning, that

the conspiracy will turn against itself in self-defense, clamping down on its own information flows in ways that will then impede

its own cognitive function. You destroy the conspiracy, in other words, by making it so paranoid of itself that it can no longer

conspire:

The more secretive or unjust an organization is, the more leaks induce fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning

coterie. This must result in minimization of efficient internal communications mechanisms (an increase in cognitive “secrecy tax”)

and consequent system-wide cognitive decline resulting in decreased ability to hold onto power as the environment demands

adaption. Hence in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust systems are nonlinearly hit relative to open, just systems.

Since unjust systems, by their nature induce opponents, and in many places barely have the upper hand, mass leaking leaves them

exquisitely vulnerable to those who seek to replace them with more open forms of governance.

The leak, in other words, is only the catalyst for the desired counter-overreaction; Wikileaks wants to provoke the conspiracy

into turning off its own brain in response to the threat. As it tries to plug its own holes and find the leakers, he reasons, its

component elements will de-synchronize from and turn against each other, de-link from the central processing network, and come

undone. Even if all the elements of the conspiracy still exist, in this sense, depriving themselves of a vigorous flow of

information to connect them all together as a conspiracy prevents them from acting as a conspiracy. As he puts it:

If total conspiratorial power is zero, then clearly there is no information flow between the conspirators and hence no

conspiracy. A substantial increase or decrease in total conspiratorial power almost always means what we expect it to mean; an

increase or decrease in the ability of the conspiracy to think, act and adapt…An authoritarian conspiracy that cannot think is

powerless to preserve itself against the opponents it induces.

In this sense, most of the media commentary on the latest round of leaks has totally missed the point. After all, why are

diplomatic cables being leaked? These leaks are not specifically about the war(s) at all, and most seem to simply be a broad swath

of the everyday normal secrets that a security state keeps from all but its most trusted hundreds of thousands of people who have

the right clearance. Which is the point: Assange is completely right that our government has conspiratorial functions. What else

would you call the fact that a small percentage of our governing class governs and acts in our name according to information which

is freely shared amongst them but which cannot be shared amongst their constituency? And we all probably knew that this was more

or less the case; anyone who was surprised that our embassies are doing dirty, secretive, and disingenuous political work as a

matter of course is naïve. But Assange is not trying to produce a journalistic scandal which will then provoke red-faced

government reforms or something, precisely because no one is all that scandalized by such things any more. Instead, he is trying

to strangle the links that make the conspiracy possible, to expose the necessary porousness of the American state’s conspiratorial

network in hopes that the security state will then try to shrink its computational network in response, thereby making itself

dumber and slower and smaller.

Early responses seem to indicate that Wikileaks is well on its way to accomplishing some of its goals. As Simon Jenkins put it (in

a great piece in its own right) “The leaks have blown a hole in the framework by which states guard their secrets.” And if the

diplomats quoted by Le Monde are right that, “we will never again be able to practice diplomacy like before,” this is exactly what

Wikileaks was trying to do. It’s sort of pathetic hearing diplomats and government shills lament that the normal work of

“diplomacy” will now be impossible, like complaining that that the guy boxing you out is making it hard to get rebounds. Poor

dears. If Assange is right to point out that his organization has accomplished more state scrutiny than the entire rest of the

journalistic apparatus combined, he’s right but he’s also deflecting the issue: if Wikileaks does some of the things that

journalists do, it also does some very different things. Assange, as his introductory remarks indicate quite clearly, is in the

business of “radically shift[ing] regime behavior.”

If Wikileaks is a different kind of organization than anything we’ve ever seen before, it’s interesting to see him put himself in

line with more conventional progressivism. Assange isn’t off base, after all, when he quotes Theodore Roosevelt’s words from his

1912 Progressive party presidential platform as the epigraph to the first essay; Roosevelt realized a hundred years ago that

“Behind the ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible government owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility

to the people,” and it was true, then too, that “To destroy this invisible government, to befoul this unholy alliance between

corrupt business and corrupt politics is the first task of statesmanship.” Assange is trying to shit all over this unholy alliance

in ways that the later and more radical Roosevelt would likely have commended.

It’s worth closing, then, by recalling that Roosevelt also coined the term “muckraker,” and that he did so as a term of

disparagement. Quoting from Pilgrim’s Progress, he cited the example of the “Muck-Raker” who could only look down, whose

perspective was so totally limited to the “muck” that it was his job to rake, he had lost all ability to see anything higher.

Roosevelt, as always, is worth quoting:

In Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress you may recall the description of the Man with the Muck-rake, the man who could look no way but

downward, with the muckrake in his hand; who was offered a celestial crown for his muck-rake, but who would neither look up nor

regard the crown he was offered, but continued to rake to himself the filth of the floor…the Man with the Muck-rake is set forth

as the example of him whose vision is fixed on carnal instead of on spiritual things. Yet he also typifies the man who in this

life consistently refuses to see aught that is lofty, and fixes his eyes with solemn intentness only on that which is vile and

debasing. Now, it is very necessary that we should not flinch from seeing what is s vile and debasing. There is filth on the

floor, and it must be scraped up with the muck-rake; and there are times and places where this service is the most needed of all

the services that can be performed. But the man who never does anything else, who never thinks or speaks or writes save of his

feats with the muck-rake, speedily becomes, not a help to society, not an incitement to good, but one of the most potent forces

for evil. There are, in the body politic, economic, and social, many and grave evils, and there is urgent necessity for the

sternest war upon them. There should be relentless exposure of and attack upon every evil man, whether politician or business man,

every evil practice, whether in politics, in business, or in social life. I hail as a benefactor every writer or speaker, every

man who, on the platform, or in book, magazine, or newspaper, with merciless severity makes such attack, provided always that he

in his turn remembers that the attack is of use only if it is absolutely truthful…

Roosevelt was many things when he uttered those words, but he was not wrong. There is a certain vicious amorality about the Mark

Zuckerberg-ian philosophy that all transparency is always and everywhere a good thing, particularly when it’s uttered by the guy

who’s busily monetizing your radical transparency. And the way most journalists “expose” secrets as a professional practice — to

the extent that they do — is just as narrowly selfish: because they publicize privacy only when there is profit to be made in

doing so, they keep their eyes on the valuable muck they are raking, and learn to pledge their future professional existence on a

continuing and steady flow of it. In muck they trust.

According to his essay, Julian Assange is trying to do something else. Because we all basically know that the US state — like all

states — is basically doing a lot of basically shady things basically all the time, simply revealing the specific ways they are

doing these shady things will not be, in and of itself, a necessarily good thing. In some cases, it may be a bad thing, and in

many cases, the provisional good it may do will be limited in scope. The question for an ethical human being — and Assange always

emphasizes his ethics — has to be the question of what exposing secrets will actually accomplish, what good it will do, what

better state of affairs it will bring about. And whether you buy his argument or not, Assange has a clearly articulated vision for

how Wikileaks’ activities will “carry us through the mire of politically distorted language, and into a position of clarity,” a

strategy for how exposing secrets will ultimately impede the production of future secrets. The point of Wikileaks — as Assange

argues — is simply to make Wikileaks unnecessary.